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This paper applies the concept of delegative democracy to contemporary devel- 
opments in Russia and Ukraine. They qualify as examples of this phenomenon 
insofar as leaders in these states are elected by the people but use their 
democratic legitimacy to justify authoritarian behavior. Factors which 
contribute to this trend are a deep socio-economic crisis, existent political 
culture, and a lack of institutions to safeguard democratic norms. While recog 
nizing the various arguments endorsing this solution, this paper concludes that 
this form of rule is unlikely to live up to its promises and ultimately under- 
mines the emergence of a representative, pluralist democracy. 
In recent years, the former communist states of the Soviet bloc have joined several 
Southern European, Latin American, and Asian states in a tidal wave of democ- 
ratization. The study of this phenomenon has become a growth industry, both 
within post-communist studies and comparative politics more generally (Bernhard, 
1993; Bova, 1991; Di Palma, 1990; Diamond and Plattner, 1993; Diamond et al., 
1988; Ekiert, 1991; Huntington, 1991; O’Donnell et al., 1986; Przeworski, 1991). At 
the same time, however, it has become apparent that existing theories and typolo- 
gies of democracy, based upon the representative, pluralist model of developed 
Western countries, may be inappropriate to describe and explain regime transi- 
tion and consolidation in a number of states. These nations may have developed 
systems which meet the minimal requirements of the genus demokratiya but share 
little in common with the extant Western democratic species.’ 
For some, this poses little problem, as nations such as Brazil, Peru, Russia, and 
Ukraine are labeled “partially democratic.” It is argued, however, that we may be 
witnessing a “new animal,” one born out of historical conditions and the severity 
of the socio-economic crisis gripping several states in transition, including many in 
the former Soviet bloc. This creature is a hybrid, a mixture of selected democratic 
norms of majoritarian rule and authoritarian practice. 
Borrowing from Guillermo O’Donnell, this phenomenon is labeled “delegative 
democracy” (O’Donnell, 1992, 1993). This paper will apply this concept to politi- 
cal developments in Russia and Ukraine, two post-communist states caught in the 
1. These requirements are that leaders are elected through competitive elections with universal 
suffrage. which fulfills the Schumpeterian definition of democracy (see Schumpeter, 1950). 
0967-067X/94/04/0423-19 0 1994 The Regents of the University of California 
Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine: P. Kubic’ek 
throes of acute crisis, although similarities can probably be found with other East 
European states and former Soviet republics. Employment of this notion forces us 
to transcend the focus on the holding of free elections, and to consider political 
developments more holistically and assess the “quality” of democracy. 
The idea of “delegative democracy” touches upon a fundamental theme in post- 
communist development: can reform and liberal democracy be pursued simulta- 
neously? While many in the West may offer a hopeful “yes” to this question, one 
could certainly argue that one priority should give way to the other. After all other 
options are proven to be unworkable, “delegative democracy” may be the last 
standing option, the least of several evils. 
This paper is divided into three parts. First, the features of delegative democ- 
racy and factors which promote its emergence are described. Second, trends in 
Russia and Ukraine which fall under the rubric of delegative democracy are 
highlighted. Finally, reflection is made upon the consequences of these develop- 
ments, which will allow us to determine if this phenomenon may be a genuine 
solution to the problems these states are facing or an impediment to further 
democratization. 
Delegative Democracy: Principles and Causes 
A delegative democracy is one which meets the formal requirements of democ- 
racy, but whose actual practice resembles that of an authoritarian state. It is 
grounded on a basic premise: the elected president is entitled to govern the 
country as s/he sees fit for the duration of the term to which s/he has been elected. 
The rule of law, a hallmark of Western democratic practice, is not well-respected. 
Typically, presidents in delegative democracies present themselves as above all 
parties and politics, since they alone can claim to represent and embody the entire 
nation. Delegative democracy is strongly majoritarian: a majority, through 
elections, empowers an individual to become the sole interpreter of the interests 
of the nation. This type of rule, however, is not commonly assumed to be 
democratic. In practice, it gives the president free reign to act as s/he pleases and 
to justify activities in the name of the people. Its closest cousin is the subtype of 
authoritarianism known as Caesarism, Bonapartism, or caudillismo (O’Donnell, 
1992, pp. 6-7). 
Delegative democracy is distinguished from representative democracy, the 
Western model, by differing notions of accountability. Representation, of course, 
involves an element of delegation, since elected officials are entitled to speak for 
their constituencies, who have “delegated” them power. Representation, however, 
entails the idea of accountability, that the “delegate” is held responsible for the 
ways in which s/he acts. In consolidated Western democracies, accountability 
operates not only directly vis-a-vis voters, but also horizontally through other insti- 
tutions which “have the capacity of calling into question and eventually punishing 
‘improper’ ways of discharging the responsibilities of the given officer” 
(O’Donnell, 1992, p. 9). 
Delegative democracy does not peu se deny the notion of accountability, but it 
does not possess the level of institutionalization which facilitates it.2 The elected 
2. Institutionalization refers to the degree that regularized patterns of interaction are engrained in the 
political arena and respected by social actors. These include both constitutional or statutory provisions 
and organizations (parties, courts, legislatures) with well-established roles. Institutions help stabilize 
the political environment by creating shared expectations and establishing common norms, principles, 
and decision-making rules. 
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president is formally accountable to the electorate, but this provides little restraint 
because institutions are too feeble to check presidential power and recall is diffi- 
cult if not impossible. Parties, courts, and interest groups may criticize presiden- 
tial actions, but these are ignored as an unnecessary impediment to the full 
authority the president has been delegated by the nation. In some cases, elected 
presidents have reversed themselves after being elected-they promise one thing 
and do its opposite-but no one is able to prevent this.3 In short, the president 
uses his/her election by the entire people as a means to legitimize his/her own 
policies and discredit opposition as sectoral, disruptive, or even unpatriotic. 
Delegation therefore includes “the right-actually the obligation-of applying to 
the nation the tough medicines that, even though many of its members cannot 
recognize it now, will heal it” (O’Donnell, 1992, p. 8). In practice, these cures are 
prescribed by state technocrats, who are protected by the president and shielded 
from popular pressures. 
O’Donnell points to two factors which have contributed to the emergence of 
delegative democracies in contemporary Latin America: historical inexperience 
with democracy and a deep socio-economic crisis. The former militates against the 
presence of a political culture supportive of democratic principles. This functions 
at the elite, institutional, and mass levels. At the elite level, memories of democ- 
racy presumably are conducive to the re-animation of principles of compromise 
and moderation, which inhibit pure, unrestrained presidentialism. Institutionally, 
previous democratic experience makes it easier for political parties and effective 
legislatures to re-emerge since they do not have to be constructed from scratch. 
At the mass level, those who are complete strangers to democracy may not have 
the requisite skills or political efficacy to believe that they can or should influence 
politics. Delegation to a supreme authority is, in a sense, “easier,” and continues 
the tradition of paternalistic government. Adding these factors together, 
O’Donnell argues that redemocratization in the cases of Uruguay and Chile is far 
easier than building democracy on a complete authoritarian historical foundation 
(O’Donnell, 1992, p. 11). 
Widespread crisis in society poses an additional barrier to the establishment of 
Western-style democracy. Crisis generates a sense of urgency, which requires a 
government of saviors. “Medicine” must be quickly shoved down society’s throat, 
regardless of what it would prefer. Advocates of delegative democracy may argue 
that anti-crisis measures-including the establishment of law and order and 
perhaps painful social and economic reforms-cannot be adopted through trade- 
offs and compromises characteristic of pluralist, representative democracy, which 
is too beholden to special interests and vagaries of public opinion. This type of 
democracy, which “institutionalizes uncertainty,” (Przeworsky, 1986, p. 58) is too 
risky because it makes the adoption of “correct” policies problematic if not impos- 
sible. Delegative democracy, on the other hand, insulates decision-makers from 
political pressures so they may adopt policies without regard to popular outcry. 
Moreover, delegative democracy promises swift policy-making, a sharp contrast to 
the snail-like processes endemic to most consolidated Western democracies. 
At this point it should be clear that this concept may be useful in the post- 
communist environment. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, no post-commu- 
3. This phenomenon is not unique to delegative democracies, i.e. Bush’s “Read my lips” pledge. Yet, 
because leaders in delegative democracies have shorter time horizons due to the imperatives of crisis 
and are free from checks by any party or other institutions, they have more leeway for this type of 
maneuver. 
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nist state has memories of democracy. Democratic institutions, therefore, had to 
be created for the first time, and in many cases they remain on shaky ground, 
competing with remnants of the old system. Vestiges of a Leninist political 
culture-including unwillingness to compromise, faith in etatism, low levels of 
trust, lack of popular initiative-remain (Jowitt, 1992; Bujvol, 1992). Public 
opinion polls reveal that immediate solutions to the socio-economic crisis-not 
more democratization-are the top priority for many individuals. This environ- 
ment is ripe for political demagoguery, as would-be autocrats can play upon 
society’s fears. This, of course, varies according to the depth of the crisis in each 
country. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are thus better candidates for 
Western style democracy than, for example, Romania, Albania, Russia, or 
Ukraine.4 
Endorsements of solutions which correspond to delegative democracy (or 
my&y [soft] authoritarianism5) abound in the Russian and the Ukrainian press. 
Referring to the “Latinoamerikanizatsiya” of society, one Russian political scien- 
tist suggested that Russia could be rescued by an “Iron Fist-Friend of the 
People,” analogous to a Just Tsar. This “democratic Caesar” is necessary to force 
economic reform upon society (Kuzmishchev, 1993). One economist in Ukraine 
argued that democratic ideals were “romantic-heroic” but “inappropriate for life 
at the end of the twentieth century.” Democratic “chatterboxes” should therefore 
yield the political stage to experts who can act in the country’s best interests and 
assuage the economic crisis (Pochentsov, 1993). The deputy minister of finance 
suggested that a strong political force must emerge which will assume the obliga- 
tion of telling the people the harsh truth and implementing reform despite protests 
from below (Post-Postup, 1993a). One member of the Liberal Party declared, 
“Ukraine does not need a Parliament. It needs a strong President with a team of 
well-qualified advisors” (K oro sei, t 1993). Reflecting a faith in expertise and 
distrust of politics, the Pinochet model has emerged in both states as a strong 
competitor to Western pluralism and liberalism.h 
I propose that we turn now to developments in Russia and Ukraine and examine 
to what extent these appeals are being made political reality. 
Manifestations of Delegative Democracy 
Russia 
After the successful defeat of communist hard-liners in the ill-fated putsch of 
August, 1991, there was hope that President Boris Yeltsin would succeed in 
guiding Russia through the arduous transition to the market and democracy. He 
introduced a series of reforms in 1992. These changes, however, have been accom- 
panied by-some would say caused-declining standards of living for many 
Russians and sparked a political backlash. Squabbles between conservative forces 
in the Congress of People’s Deputies and the president threatened to derail reform 
and paralyse the Russian state. These culminated in the dissolution of parliament 
and the return of tanks to the streets of Moscow. Yeltsin’s actions in the autumn 
4. An excellent source for comparative public opinion is the World Value Survey, most recently 
conducted in 1990-1991. Ronald Inglehart at the University of Michigan kindly provided me access to 
this data. 
5. In numerous interviews in Ukraine, this frequently arose as a favored solution to the current crisis. 
6. In Ukraine I was informed that “Fans of Pinochet” clubs exist in many cities. Unfortunately, I was 
unable to investigate them. 
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of 1993 reveal most clearly movement toward delegative democracy (Migranyan, 
1993). 
These developments, however, should not have come as a complete surprise to 
astute observers of Russian politics. Conflict had been brewing for some time. 
Throughout 1992, the pace of reform, the composition of the government, and 
constitutional changes proved to be sources of friction between Yeltsin and the 
Russian parliament. The Congress, headed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, passed a series 
of constitutional amendments designed to restrict Yeltsin’s powers. Yeltsin’s 
decree banning the activities of arch-conservatives, especially the National 
Salvation Front, was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Some 
aides urged Yeltsin to dissolve parliament and impose direct presidential rule, 
while others sought a compromise through a national referendum. In March, 1993, 
the Congress rejected proposals for power-sharing and a referendum, and Yeltsin 
responded by issuing a decree of “special rule,” which placed him above the legis- 
lature. This sparked widespread opposition and an attempt at impeachment, which 
narrowly failed. Seeking to defuse this political crisis, both sides agreed to hold a 
national referendum, which asked Russians if they had confidence in the presi- 
dent, supported his policies, and wanted early presidential and parliamentary 
elections. The results of the April 25 plebiscite were a moral victory for Yeltsin, 
but a majority of all eligible voters failed to support his call for early parliamen- 
tary elections7 
The political climate heated up in the summer of 1993. Yeltsin’s supporters and 
opponents blamed each other for political gridlock and deteriorating economic 
conditions, and exchanged charges of corruption. Parliament continued to adopt 
laws, decrees, and resolutions which threatened Yeltsin’s reforms. Regional 
leaders and political bodies chose sides between Yeltsin and the Congress. The 
state was virtually paralysed. 
The pot finally boiled over on September 21 when Yeltsin issued the decree 
“On Gradual Constitutional Reform in Russia,” which called for the dissolution 
of parliament, direct presidential rule for three months, and elections for a newly 
created State Duma. The Constitutional Court, parliament, and even many pro- 
reform forces declared this move unconstitutional. Yeltsin then supported his 
initial decree by suspending the Constitutional Court, closing a number of newspa- 
pers, imposing temporary censorship on all remaining periodicals, and banning the 
activities of a number of opposition groups. He also ordered the dissolution of 
local councils throughout Russia, claiming these bodies were a block to reform. 
Their powers were assumed by local executives appointed by the president. The 
nation was brought to the brink of civil war as parliament refused to disband and 
called on the army for support. Yeltsin, with the crucial support of the military 
and security forces, eventually forced his opponents to yield after parliament was 
shelled and stormed, producing numerous casualties. 
Yeltsin’s next move was to schedule a national referendum on his draft of a new 
constitution, which was to be held on the same day as the vote for the State Duma. 
This draft, published barely a month before the referendum, was “not the product 
of public consent or political compromise but the embodiment of the President’s 
7. Exact figures for the vote can be found in ITAR-TASS (1993). Sixty-four per cent of eligible voters 
took part in the referendum. Of these, 58 per cent said they had confidence in the president, 53 per 
cent expressed support for his policies, 67 per cent wanted new parliamentary elections, and just over 
50 per cent were in favor of early presidential elections. These last two provisions required a major- 
ity of all eligible voters to become legally binding, and this did not occur. 
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will” (Lysenko, 1993, p. l), and many feared that it could establish the basis for 
an authoritarian regime in Russia. In brief, this document gives the presidency the 
upper hand in the Russian political arena. He enjoys wide powers of appointment 
and the right to dissolve the State Duma. He may declare a state of emergency 
which does not require approval, but only “confirmation” by the Council of 
Federation, the upper legislative chamber .8 He may dismiss the government 
without approval of the State Duma. Impeachment procedures exist, but are rather 
cumbersome. The relationship between the center and the republics strongly 
favors Moscow. One observer declared that the Fundamental Laws of 1906 gave 
Tsar Nicholas II less power than the proposed constitution (Ustyuzhanin, 1993). 
Nonetheless, amid charges of electoral irregularities, the constitution was 
approved by a bare majority of voters on December 12, 1993 (Slater, 1994).’ 
These actions, which exhibit a strong authoritarian character, fall under the 
rubric of delegative democracy. Yeltsin was popularly elected, and the results of 
the April, 1993, referendum further bolstered his claim to be the voice of the 
people. While admitting that his September decree was unconstitutional, he explic- 
itly referred to his prior mandate, claiming that the parliament had trampled on 
the will of the people expressed in the referendum and that “the security of Russia 
and its peoples is more precious than formal compliance with the contradictory 
norms established by a legislative power that has definitely discredited itself” 
(Izvestia, 1993a, p. l).l” Throughout this period, Yeltsin put himself above party 
politics, constantly justifying his actions as for the good of the Russian people. 
The problem should be clear. Yeltsin, while formally accountable to “the 
people,” assumed monopoly right to interpret their collective will. The slogan, 
“The people’s opinion is above the law,” became a staple in the rhetoric of 
Yeltsin’s supporters, which, since Yeltsin is the interpreter of their opinion, means 
that Yeltsin need not worry about the legal legitimacy of his actions (Pastukhov, 
1993). Yeltsin has branded his opponents-even those of the centrist Civic 
Union-as communists or fascists (Tolz, 1993). Meanwhile, he has put himself 
above reproach, operating on the principle, “The state-it is I.” This is indicative 
of a broader elite political culture, which includes elements of dilettantism, the 
inability to reach compromises, the unwillingness to listen to each other, and the 
readiness to discredit opponents by any means necessary, endemic in Russia today 
(Kuvaldin, 1993). 
Yeltsin has found significant support for his policies. One writer accused the 
intelligentsia of serving as provocateur and instigator of Yeltsin’s anti-democratic 
actions (Shokhina, 1993). These “democrats” sacrificed legality for the sake of 
political expediency. From March until October, members of the intelligentsia 
repeatedly urged the President to declare a state of emergency and attack 
opponents in parliament (Wishnevsky, 1993). Yeltsin received high levels of public 
support (68-72 per cent) throughout the crisis in October (Cline et al., 1993). This 
does not necessarily mean that the public actively supported the use of force, but 
it can be taken to mean that, at minimum, the public resigned itself to Yeltsin’s 
actions as a necessary step. Moreover, one should not forget about the role played 
8. It is not immediately clear from the document that the state of emergency can be rescinded by this 
body. 
9. Aside from the weakly substantiated charge of government tampering with ballots, the opposition 
also claimed that state media campaigns made the vote unfair. Political parties, for example, were 
prohibited from using delegated airtime to criticize the draft constitution or the president. 
IO. Yeltsin, of course, conveniently forgot about the majority of April voters who endorsed early presi- 
dential elections. 
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by the army and security organs, whose entrance into the political arena may raise 
concern about Russia’s political future. 
Yeltsin’s actions were facilitated by a lack of institutions powerful enough to 
instill and maintain respect for the law. The Constitutional Court, which sided with 
parliament (for legal and political reasons), was circumvented by legal means by 
Yeltsin in the first half of 1993. Yeltsin also stripped its head of his state dacha 
and security service (Slater, 1993). Its activities were then suspended when polit- 
ically expedient. Recent legislation will further limit the powers of the Court to 
rule on issues that irked Yeltsin in the past (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1994a). The 
Ministry of Justice, ostensibly empowered to enforce the law, issued a puzzling 
comment that “although he [Yeltsin] did go beyond legal boundaries, he acted in 
accordance with the constitutional principles of democracy” (Slater and Tolz, 1993, 
p. 3). Both Yeltsin and his opponents argued that the 1978 Soviet Constitution- 
legally supreme until the Russian Constitution was approved-was outdated and 
could therefore be ignored. This created a major problem, since an established 
separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, in addition 
to judicial independence, did not exist. Violations of the constitution were routine, 
and a plethora of amendments were passed as political actors saw fit. Rule by 
decree replaced the rule of law. I1 Political parties were in a poor position to 
counter Yeltsin’s moves. They were-and are-weak, lack organization, resources, 
and stable constituencies, and are more tied to individual personalities than any 
particular program. Until very recently, Yeltsin was the very personification of 
reform, and therefore it was difficult for parties interested in reform to distance 
themselves from the President. Moreover, since Yeltsin himself is not a member 
of any party, it makes it more difficult for fledgling political parties to exercise 
much influence on him. 
Civic organizations also lack the power to counter rule imposed from above. 
Many were-and still are-allied to the pro-Yeltsin Democratic Russia movement. 
Business associations in the umbrella group Civic Union, along with their centrist 
allies, were unable to dissuade Yeltsin from his agenda of disbanding parliament 
by any means necessary. The labor movement, despite strikes in some regions, has 
been unable to organize itself into a coherent, potent political force. The 
Federation of Independent Unions of Russia, a holdover from the communist era 
which represents 90 per cent of all unions, is anti-Yeltsin and a proponent of 
slower reform. However, it has been unable to mobilize its members or effectively 
link itself with other parties or movements (Izvestia, 1993b). According to one 
report, “the actual workings of the union movement are so chaotic that it is impos- 
sible to understand who represents who, who is protected, who can be mobilized, 
and who are impostors,” and most members of the federation do not even know 
about its existence (Izvestia, 1994, p. 4). 
Finally, one can find support for delegative democracy in public opinion surveys. 
According to polls conducted in November, 1993, a month before the election, 
only 25 per cent of the electorate was familiar with the programs of different polit- 
ical parties. Over half were not familiar with the platform of the party for which 
they intended to vote (Corning, 1993). This means that voters continue to have a 
personalized view of politics, voting for personalities over policies. This makes 
accountability more difficult because political platforms become less important. 
11. In 1992, Yeltsin issued 1727 decrees and 811 directives, and in the first six months of 1993 the 
respective numbers were 955 and 460. Khasbulatov also issued a high number of decrees and personal 
directives. Meanwhile, in 1992 the Supreme Soviet passed only 112 laws (see Gualtieri, 1993). 
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“Delegates” are not bound to them-since voters do not know about them-so 
they may do as they want. One survey in May, 1993, revealed that 66 per cent of 
Russians thought Russia needed a strong leader to control parliament. Later, in 
October, half of respondents to one survey favored the emergence of a “strong 
hand” to restore order (Izvestia, 1993~). This, no doubt, reflects frustration with 
the existent “democracy” and a desire for simple and effective solutions to restore 
social and economic order. More disturbing for any form of democracy are the 
actual results of the December elections, in which Zhironovsky’s Liberal- 
Democratic Party won the most votes by party list and communists also fared well. 
What are we to make of these trends? Does delegative democracy have a future 
in Russia? One can point to some recent events which may signal the decline of 
this form of rule. The State Duma, in which pro-Yeltsin forces are outnumbered 
by his opponents, has convened, and Yeltsin has bowed to pressure and appointed 
more conservatives to the government. Yeltsin himself has for unknown reasons 
receded somewhat from the political landscape, and Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin has emerged as a major figure. Former Yeltsin allies are discussing 
formation of a new party which will be pro-reform but not dependent upon Yeltsin 
(Nezavisimaya Gnzeta, 1994b). Finally, the new constitution, while far from 
perfect, does specify a division of powers and establishes an independent judiciary. 
These are positive signs, but the political future of Russia is far from certain. 
Zhironovsky’s recent success is cause for alarm, and the possibility of his winning 
the presidency is most unsettling. Meanwhile, “democrats” of a more Western 
orientation-Gaidar and Yavlinsky-were defeated at the polls and are not a part 
of the current government. Yeltsin and the State Duma are working together, but 
the risk of acrimony between him and a more conservative parliament recalls the 
experience of last autumn. There is no steadfast guarantee that constitutional 
provisions will be respected since democratic traditions and institutions remain 
weak. Recently, Yeltsin has again taken to rule by decree on the issues of minis- 
terial appointments, which directly contradicts the approved Constitution which 
reserves this power to the prime minister (Tolz, 1994). Finally, and probably most 
importantly, much will be decided by economic and social conditions in the 
country. If they fail to improve, calls for a “strong hand” will likely grow louder. 
Yeltsin has already demonstrated his willingness to heed that call. In short, condi- 
tions in Russia make the development of an institutionalized, stable democracy 
precarious at best. 
Ukraine 
Ukraine may be an even more fertile ground for delegative democracy than 
Russia. Since winning independence in 1991, Ukraine has plunged into a deep 
economic crisis. Production and GDP dropped by almost 20 per cent in both 1992 
and 1993, while inflation in 1993 jumped to over 10000 per cent (Post-Postup, 
1994). Public opinion surveys regularly reveal widespread levels of dissatisfaction 
and little confidence in the future. I2 By most measures, Ukraine is faring worse 
than Russia. This is supported by two pieces of anecdotal evidence: the Russian 
ruble is considered hard currency in Ukraine and the verb “to Ukrainianize” 
12. According to one survey of 1000 Ukrainians conducted in early 1993, 73 per cent of the respon- 
dents stated they were not satisfied with their current lives. In another poll of 1400 citizens, only 24.28 
per cent expected conditions to improve during 1993. Both surveys were conducted by the Institute of 
Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. I would like to thank Eugene Sinnitsyn of 
Socialinform for providing me with access to this data. 
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(ukrainizirovat) has entered the Russian vocabulary with a pejorative meaning. 
Meanwhile, public confidence in organs of state power has fallen throughout 1993 
in response to continued stagnation and a perception that there are too many polit- 
ical games being played in Kiev (Ukruinsky Ohlyndach, 1994). In short, both 
within the state and in society at large there is a growing recognition that the time 
for political debates is over and that concrete solutions and strong leadership are 
needed to extricate Ukraine from crisis. 
Politically, Ukraine has remained comparatively stable, as there has been no 
civil war, attempted coup d’etat, or hint of military intervention in political affairs. 
The most prevalent political theme throughout 1992-1993 was the effort of the 
“party of power” (Ryabchuk, 1992) or the “new nomenklatura” to consolidate and 
centralize power. The “party of power” refers to the former communists who have 
continued to dominate the upper echelons of Ukrainian politics. While its 
members may have formally surrendered their party cards, the “party of power” 
may be labeled “crypt0-communist,” that is, “it is characterized by economic and 
political conservatism, a penchant for authoritarianism and command-administra- 
tive methods, and clan connections.” If the party before played a “leading and 
directing” role, the new “party” plays a “manipulative” one (Ryabchuk, 1994a, pp. 
4-5). However, this elite is no longer a “comprador elite” or an administrative 
bureaucracy for Moscow. It has become a genuine Ukrainian elite, and it tries to 
present itself as the greatest defender of Ukrainian statehood. 
President Leonid Kravchuk, the former ideology secretary of the Ukrainian 
Communist Party, is commonly assumed to be the head of the %‘party of power.” 
Kravchuk was popularly elected in December, 1991, and since that time he has 
taken several steps along the path toward delegative democracy. Kravchuk, who 
lacks ties to any registered party, has consistently placed himself above politics, 
arguing that “all patriotic forces should be consolidated around the task of state- 
building, and overcome personal ambition and neglect ‘insignificant’ tactical 
discrepancies for the sake of a greater strategic goal” (Ryabchuk, 1994b). He 
accused opposition political parties of hindering a calm life and work by “specu- 
lating on workers and advancing private interests” (Post-Postup, 1993b, p. 3). 
Breaking a promise to hold a referendum of confidence on him and the legisla- 
ture, Kravchuk claimed that proponents of a referendum “bring nothing to our 
people except trouble” (Halos Ukmirzy, 1993a, p. 4). Meanwhile, he has placed 
himself above reproach, announcing that he (and his allies) “are” the state 
(Neznvisirnost, 1993a). 
This rhetoric has been supported by efforts to centralize power. In May, 1993, 
in the wake of a crisis of authority between himself and the prime minister, he 
took steps to concentrate all executive power in his own hands, trying to obtain 
the sweeping privileges enjoyed by other presidents in delegative democracies. He 
failed initially, but in September, 1993, he issued a presidential order and assumed 
leadership of the Cabinet of Ministers and placed his allies in power to create a 
team of “like thinkers” (Izvestia, 1993d). He extended his power through his 
appointed presidential representatives in the oblasts, who are accountable only to 
him and who have been accused of running their districts like a private fief. Like 
Yeltsin, he has shown a fondness for ruling by decree, and presidential orders on 
questions of social and economic policy are issued without public debate and are 
only printed post facto in official papers. 
Although Kravchuk is the elected president, he is not the only example consis- 
tent with the precepts of delegated democracy. Former prime minister-now presi- 
dent-Leonid Kuchma shares much in common with Kravchuk. In November, 
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1992, Kuchma was unanimously elected prime minister by the Verkhovna Rada, 
the Ukrainian parliament, and granted extraconstitutional powers to resolve the 
economic crisis. The Verkhovna Rada, in effect, “delegated” its decision-making 
powers to Kuchma because the former was unable or unwilling to assume respon- 
sibility for governance. 
Kuchma, however, let it immediately be known that he was a manager, not a 
politician, and for him the word politics assumed a pejorative tone (N&s Ukruiny, 
1993b; Nezavisimost, 1993b) .I3 He complained that politics dominated the 
economy, and asserted that people simply want to conduct their own affairs and 
are tired of political conversation. He maintained that he would serve as prime 
minister only if he was granted extraconstitutional powers, and he repeatedly 
threatened to resign if his cabinet was not approved in full or if his power was 
curtailed. He advised all political parties to go on a vacation-hopefully a long 
one-to let his executive authority work (Nezavisimost, 1993~). While he admit- 
ted that mistakes were made under his tutelage, he blamed them on a lack of quali- 
fied personnel and excessive interference by groups in parliament (Uryadovy 
Kuryer, 1993). 
Kuchma coupled his reliance upon bureaucratic methods with calls for order. 
Upon assuming power, he announced, “We should understand that when people 
are brought to this situation (social crisis), privatization slogans, social 
demagoguery, and political speculation can become the beginning of a mass, 
spontaneous upheaval” (Izvestia, 1992, p. 1). In February he issued an appeal for 
“zhorctkii uryad,” which can be translated as “harsh, ” “strict” or “orderly govern- 
ment” (Wolos Ukrainy, 1993b). Stability, of course, is necessary for the overall 
health of society. However, when combined with a clear disdain for competitive 
politics and public accountability, these calls may foreshadow the appearance of 
something more malevolent, especially if the continued crisis sparks public disor- 
der. 
Kuchma finally resigned, and Efim Zvyagilsky, a former mine director and 
mayor of Donetsk enjoying the patronage of Kravchuk, was appointed to replace 
him. He was less visible than Kuchma, reflecting in part Kravchuk’s political pre- 
eminence. However, judging from his record in Donetsk, Zvyagilsky also fitted the 
mold of a “democrat” with an iron fist (Nezavisimost, 1993d). His most notable 
political accomplishment was to break the Donetsk miners’ strike in June, 1993, 
by promising to hold a public referendum of confidence in the president and the 
Verkhovna Rada. This, of course, was later rejected by Kravchuk, with the appar- 
ent acquiescence of his Donetsk ally. 
Other officials also support moves consistent with delegative democracy. The 
head of the parliamentary commission on economic reform argued that Ukraine 
requires a “professional” legislature of experts, free from the pernicious influence 
of political parties, and, thereby, free from popular pressures and institutions of 
accountability (HO/OS Ukruiny, 1993~). Another member of the commission 
accused private lobbyists of hindering the government, which, in his opinion, 
should be left to determine what is best for society (HO/OS Ukminy, 1993d). An 
informal survey of state bureaucrats at the Institute for State Administration and 
13. Kuchma was the director of the South Machine !3uilding Works in Dnepropetrovsk, a giant 
military-industrial plant. One analyst suggested that Kuchma’s status as an economic “expert” played 
a decisive role in his appointment, since “the popular opinion (is) that managers, unlike politicians, do 
‘real business’. They know the real state of the economy and those measures which should be taken 
to overcome the crisis.” See Kievsky (1993). p. 1. 
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Self-Government in Kiev reveals support for both democracy and “professional- 
ism” in isolation, but when a tension was posed between these two goals, over 
two-thirds stated that the participation of the people in the process of making 
decisions is not necessary if the process is guided by competent leaders.‘” The 
message is clear and simple: vote, but you better elect well-qualified individuals 
and then let them do what they deem best. 
Ukraine lacks the institutions to counter movement toward a delegative democ- 
racy. The court system, weak and dependent upon the executive, lacks the power 
and/or will to check growing state power. For example, the court did not review 
a bank directive, approved by the Cabinet, which fixed the exchange rate, despite 
claims by the opposition that it violated three statutes of the banking law (Post- 
Postup. 1993~). One independent trade union sought justice for state violation of 
the labor law at the International Court instead of pursuing the matter through 
Ukrainian courts (Halos Ukrainy, 1993e). Ukraine, like Russia until December, 
1993, also lacks its own constitution, meaning that basic principles of government 
are left to a panoply of laws and interpretations which do not clearly demarcate 
separation of powers. 
Parties and civic organizations have been, until very recently, ineffective against 
the “party of power.” Political parties in Ukraine-like those in many post- 
communist states-suffer from numerous problems: low membership, lack of 
financial resources, ill-defined constituencies. They have been politically passive, 
reacting to events and decisions rather than developing their own proposals. 
Perhaps their greatest defeat was on the adoption of the Ukrainian electoral law, 
arguably the most important issue to the nascent parties. Despite their attempts 
to reach a compromise with the “party of power” and create a mixed majoritar- 
ian-proportional representation system (like Germany), the adopted law was 
purely majoritarian, bestowing advantages upon “independent” candidates of the 
“party of power” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1993, 1994c). 
Moreover, some of the “opposition” has been supportive of Kravchuk’s maneu- 
vers to centralize power. This is most clearly manifested in the Congress of 
National Democratic Forces (CNDF), which places first priority on the state, and 
then (perhaps) democracy. The Republican Party, which composes the largest 
force in the CNDF, is often referred to as the “president’s party,” and now that 
Kravchuk is out of power it has endorsed his bid to become an MP and suggested 
that he head a new nationalist bloc in parliament (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1994d). 
Larisa Skorik, the leader of the more nationalist branch of Rukh, declared she 
could support a Ukrainian Pinochet and proposed that Kravchuk adopt harsh 
presidential rule to restore order to the country (Nezav~~~mo~t, 1993e). Even Rukh 
itself, which later grew vocal in its opposition to Kravchuk, was initially very 
hesitant to criticize Kravchuk. Its leader Vyadcheslav Chornovil lamented that 
“Our biggest mistake was to surrender our principles of independence and democ- 
racy to other hands which have always been indifferent or hostile to them...An 
incredible amount of damage to our democratic ideals has occurred” (Vysoky 
Zamok, 1992). Ultimately, the “national-democrats” were “used like children” by 
14. This is based upon 42 responses to written questionnaires distributed by the present author in April, 
1993. The respondents were all state officials or individuals planning to enter the administration after 
a year of graduate training. It is by no means a random sample, but one might expect the bias to fall 
in a more “democratic” direction since the respondents are disproportionately from Kiev and have 
been exposed to Western training. I would like to thank the Institute’s director, Dr. Bohdan 
Krawchenko, for his assistance. On another question, only 32 per cent thought that Ukraine needs 
more pluralism and citizen participation and less state control. 
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the party of power, and one observer commented that their inability to distance 
themselves from Kravchuk helped precipitate a communist-socialist electoral 
victory (Ryabchuk, 1994a). 
For their part, civic organizations have not been strong sources of opposition to 
the current regime. In part, Ukraine may suffer from “residual corporatism,” since 
structures from the communist era dominate independent groups in civil society. 
Leaders of various associations-agricultural groups, business confederations-are 
part of the new nomenklatura. Trade unions, arguably the organizations with the 
most potential political power, suffer from sectoral, regional, and ethnic divisions, 
charges of corruption, and a lack of public confidence.15 Moreover, although they 
are all “independent,” most remain loyal to the ancien regime and a large percent- 
age of the union leadership are former obkom or rajkom secretaries who have 
extensive ties to the economic and political directorate. This is exemplified by 
Oleksandr Stoian, a former adviser to Kravchuk who has assumed the leadership 
of the Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine. Perhaps it is therefore not surpris- 
ing that this association, to which 97 per cent of workers belong, considered the 
proposed referendum counter-productive, despite the fact that it was granted as a 
concession to striking workers (Halos Ukrainy, 1993f). 
Finally, support for delegative democracy can be discerned from surveys of 
public opinion, which show that individuals are most upset over matters of 
economics and law and order, while few are concerned with the slow pace of 
democratic political reform.ih This is accompanied by continued faith in statist 
solutions, as 55 per cent in one survey claimed the state should assume responsi- 
bility for the maintenance of society, while only 18 per cent believed that primary 
responsibility rests with the people themselves. In addition, there are abysmally 
low feelings of political efficacy. In one survey, only 2 per cent of respondents 
indicated that they felt they could effectively participate in political life. More 
prevalent were responses of disillusionment (17.2 per cent), a feeling that they 
were just as powerless as before (19 per cent), a lack of interest in politics (24.4 
per cent). 
Participation in civic associations is also very low. According to data from a 
November, 1991, survey, only 2 per cent of the respondents claimed membership 
in a civic-political movement or a local civic organization, and 70 per cent stated 
they belonged to no social organization. This compares unfavorably to the United 
States, where 75 per cent of individuals belong to some type of civic organization. 
Moreover, on virtually all counts, civic participation has dropped from the levels 
of 1989, reflecting, perhaps, growing feelings of alienation and hopelessness 
(Golovakha, 1992). All of these indicators bode well for delegation as opposed to 
participation. 
Recent events in Ukraine have brought some changes to the political arena. In 
the July, 1994. presidential run-off between the two Leonids, Kuchma prevailed 
and became president. Not surprisingly, his program was full of mutually exclu- 
sive promises, resulting in difficulty in pinning him down to any particular 
15. According to a poll conducted in May. 1993, 40.6 per cent of respondents stated they had no 
confidence in unions. whereas only 2.7 per cent expressed absolute confidence (see Nezavisin~o.st, 
lYY3f). 
16. When asked to name what made them the most unhappy in 1992, 72.2 per cent said rising prices, 
22.2 per cent a deficit of necessary products, 21 per cent a loss of order and stability, and 17.8 per cent 
a fall in output. Only 4.4 per cent cited the slowing of democratic reform. Unless otherwise stated. all 
figures come from surveys conducted by the Institute of Sociology in early 1993. Again, thanks to 
Eugene Sinnitsyn for providing me access to this data. 
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program.” Judging from his initial moves as president, however, it appears that 
the style of leadership, if not the content itself, has not significantly changed. Like 
Kravchuk, Kuchma belongs to no political party. ix One of his first presidential 
orders, “On Urgent Measures to Strengthen the Fight against Crime,” was 
condemned by three Ukrainian legal groups for violating both Ukrainian law and 
international human rights standards. Kuchma’s response was “I know that this 
order is not to everyone’s liking. The majority of simple people who work for a 
living supported it. As for the ‘fat cats,’ this order is a fish in their eye [??I” 
(Novosti, 1994, p. 2). Kuchma, of course, in no way consulted these “simple 
people.” and instead seems to assume implicitly that since he was elected his 
policies ipso f&to have public support. Moreover, he has also taken steps to gain 
greater executive power and subjugate the popularly-elected chairmen of regional 
councils to his own authority, which violated a previous understanding he had 
arranged with other leaders and de facto reanimates the prefect system used by 
his predecessor (Nezavisimuya Gazera, 1994e). In sum, one could argue that the 
technocratically-minded Kuchma, now armed with democratic legitimacy, may 
push Ukraine further along the path toward delegative democracy. 
Nonetheless, it is still not clear that this path should be abandoned. Perhaps 
advocates of delegative democracy or “my&y” authoritarianism are right: plural- 
ist democracy is inappropriate for current conditions and should be pursued only 
once the crisis has been overcome. In the next section, therefore, I will examine 
what are the likely impacts of this course and what, if any, alternatives would be 
superior. 
Latent Dangers and Possible Alternatives 
At first blush, delegative democracy may seem to be the appropriate political 
response to the crisis gripping Russia, Ukraine, and other post-communist states. 
Unlike pure authoritarianism, it does not rely exclusively on raw power and can 
claim some fidelity to certain democratic principles, giving the leadership an aura 
of legitimacy. However, unlike liberal democracy, derided as a system of endless 
talk and debate, delegative democracy promises strong, authoritative leadership. 
Decisions can therefore be made more swiftly and in accordance with national, 
not particular, interests. 
Despite its claims to avoid the uncertainties of Western-style democracy, delega- 
tive democracy entails risks of its own. Appeals for enlightened leaders-philoso- 
pher-kings-who pursue “the good” can be traced back to Plato, yet attempts to 
realize them have often brought something more malevolent. Atrocities of all sorts 
have been committed for the greater good of the people. Unrestrained power 
opens itself up to abuse. The editor of Nezavisimaya Gazeta suggested that 
Yeltsin’s actions, despite their good intentions, have historical parallels with those 
of Nicholas II and Lenin, both of whom dissolved elected assemblies and moved 
toward authoritarianism and repression. The losers on both occasions were the 
Russian people (Tretyakov, 1993). A repeat of these events is not out of the 
question. One writer remarked: 
17. For example, he promised to stop inflation and implement real reforms, but also assured his 
supporters in the state economic sector that they would enjoy more subsidies. 
18. Reflecting the weakness of Ukrainian political parties, only one of the original seven presidential 
candidates, Oleksandr Moroz, was clearly connected to any political party (Moroz is leader of the 
Socialist Party). 
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It is easier to destroy communism than to create a viable democratic organism. In 
the process of transformation rips in the social fabric are unavoidable, as people are 
placed on different sides, and one’s own view of the present is taken as the truth. In 
this moment there is nothing more dangerous than for the state to accept only one 
point of view as truth... . (Kuvaldin, 1993, p. 2). 
Moreover, two claimed advantages of delegative democracy-authoritative 
leadership and adoption of “correct,” “scientific” solutions-are grossly 
overstated. Presidents in a delegative democracy are simultaneously omnipotent 
and impotent. On paper, they are able to issue edicts, decrees, and directives on 
a wide range of social questions. Implementation, however, is a problem. In order 
for reforms to succeed, presidents need the supporting actions of other social 
actors. However, because of the “self-indulgent solitude” of policy-making, plus 
the weakness of institutions it has accentuated, cooperation with other actors is 
difficult (O’Donnell, 1992). Orders from the top are ignored, impossible to imple- 
ment, or may contradict decrees from other bodies, creating more chaos than 
order. Certainly this has been the case in both Russia and Ukraine. This predica- 
ment recalls Gorbachev’s efforts to create a revolution from above, which failed 
because forces from below either dragged their feet or rushed on ahead, creating 
more political instability. One solution to this problem, of course, is a return to 
Stalinism, but this is a prospect that few would endorse. 
Delegative democracy’s implicit promise of magical policy-making, which will 
bring technical knowledge to politics to devise “correct” solutions, is also dubious. 
Cynically, one can suggest that the leadership will be predisposed to seek advan- 
tages for itself, and not policies for the good of the country. Policies are not subject 
to debate in the “free marketplace of ideas,” which vaccinates representative 
democracies against gross mistakes (O’Donnell, 1992, p. 9). Moreover, pure 
“technocratism”-reflected in “shock therapy” solutions-has not been politically 
feasible for any Russian or Ukrainian leader. A better solution, which corresponds 
to the style of policy-making in representative democracy, may be for compro- 
mises and shared responsibility, which bolsters prospects for implementation and 
political stability. 
Finally, delegative democracy makes the construction of lasting democratic insti- 
tutions problematic. In other words, delegative democracy is unlikely to work as 
a first step toward democratic consolidation. It deepens the defects imputed to 
democratic institutions by hampering their development. Thus, it becomes a self- 
fulfilling prophecy: it emerges amidst claims that other institutions are weak and 
then it imposes conditions which weaken them further, requiring its continued 
existence, For example, in Ukraine political parties have been virtually shut out 
of the political process. Partially as a consequence, they suffer from abysmally low 
scores of public confidence because the public believes they are unable to accom- 
plish anything.‘” Delegative democracy thus creates a vicious cycle, effectively 
removing liberal democracy as an option. Moreover, when and if the executive 
needs legislative support, it is bound to find a resentful congress that does not feel 
political responsibility. This fosters the decline in prestige of all parties and politi- 
19. Throughout 1993, polls revealed that political parties were trusted less than the president or the 
legislature. For example, in a survey conducted by the pro-reform group “Democratic Initiative,” only 
0.6 per cent of the respondents said they completely trusted political parties. whereas 60.3 per cent 
claimed they did not trust them at all. Evidence of their lack of exposure (irrelevance??) is that a non- 
existent party, the Party of Order and Justice, was third in popularity among parties (see Ukrainsky 
Ohladach. 1994). 
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cians, who are caught in a “colossal prisoner’s dilemma,” since it is very difficult 
(if not impossible) to build political bridges and form workable coalitions 
(O’Donnell, 1992, pp. 13-14). This, in turn, contributes to governmental gridlock, 
which bolsters claims for more authoritarian rule. 
In O’Donnell’s words, the result is a “terrible drama” (1992, p. 15). Countries 
lacking a democratic tradition have to cope with the negative legacies of their 
authoritarian past in the midst of a deep social and economic crisis. They are 
placed in an unenviable position: effective institutions and a democratic political 
culture cannot be built overnight, yet the pressures of the crisis require institu- 
tions which can deal with a number of urgent problems. Thus, individuals may 
claim that delegative democracy or outright authoritarianism, while risky, is the 
only possible path to avoid further social chaos. 
This is a claim that proponents of democratization must take seriously. One 
cannot, as some democrats might, exclusively appeal to the intelligence and 
goodwill of political elites and voters to preserve democratic principles. This is 
simply too utopian. Moreover, the conclusion that more time is needed to make 
democracy work-reasonable though it is-rings hollow as individuals believe that 
they or their country as a whole has no time to waste. Can democracy offer 
anything more than empty promises? 
Fortunately, the experience of Eastern Europe and Latin America shows that it 
can. Granted, nations in both of these regions still face immense problems. However, 
in Latin America, Chile and Uruguay, two states whose system approximates a repre- 
sentative democracy, have fared better than Argentina, Brazil, or Peru, which have 
been “unmitigated disasters in terms of economic and social policy” (O’Donnell, 
1992, p. ll).*” The latter have suffered through “reform packages” imposed from 
above, which have only worsened the initial problems. In contrast, in Uruguay the 
President has been forced to go through Congress, and the resultant incremental, 
more modest policies have produced economic improvement. Meanwhile, most East 
European states are parliamentary democracies. Constitutionally, parliaments 
dominate over presidents, whose powers are severely restricted in comparison to 
those of Yeltsin or Kravchuk (McGregor, 1994).*’ Nonetheless, many-if not all- 
have made more progress than Russia or Ukraine on issues of political and economic 
reform, despite changes in government or shifts in coalitions.*? 
At this point, we might reflect on what can be done to bolster prospects for 
democratic consolidation in Russia and Ukraine.,.One obvious suggestion is the 
20. One can, of course. argue that Chile and IJruguay started out with inherent advantages over the 
others. The key point here, however, is that representative democracy is not per se a barrier to 
economic success in nations with acute problems. 
21. For example. in none of the IS states McGregor examined did the president enjoy unqualified 
power to issue decrees or the right to dissolve parliament. Those presidents commonly thought to have 
extraordinary power-Walesa in Poland, Tudjman in Croatia-benefit from personal credibility and 
non-constitutional provisions. 
22. Again, one may argue that this success has been achieved due to the relative (compared to Russia 
or Ukraine) lack of crisis in these states, which has allowed democracy to function. However. govern- 
ments in these states have been able to implement decisions in difficult circumstances and, for the most 
part, enjoy public support. The case of Poland is particularly instructive. Despite numerous changes in 
government, Poland. while no utopia, is an economic success story and now enjoys the fastest rate of 
economic growth in Europe. Arguably, the creation of representative democracy, based upon political 
parties, has contributed to regime stability by lengthening time horizons for political actors and bolster- 
ing feelings of political efficacy among the citizenry. Nonetheless, it is difficult to disentangle the two 
variables--pre-existing conditions or the new political system-as the “cause” of political and economic 
successes. At minimum, however, representative democracy should not be assumed to be analogous 
with ineffective government. 
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creation of a multi-party system with capable political parties. Russia has already 
moved in this direction because its electoral law, stipulating that half of all parlia- 
mentarians will come from voting on party lists, encourages formation of political 
parties. Those parties currently in the State Duma now need to consolidate their 
programs and constituencies and seek political partners. Education and the gaining 
of political visibility will be important tasks for these parties. They must also 
assume some political initiative, i.e. introduce legislation, public opinion 
campaigns, etc., to prove their political acumen to a still skeptical electorate. 
Prospects in Ukraine, unfortunately, are worse. There, elections were held under 
the majoritarian system, and 89 per cent of all candidates were independents 
(Uryadovy Kuryer, 1994). As long as this system exists, Ukraine will be captive to 
the politics of personality, and “independents,” unburdened by platforms or intra- 
party discipline, will be given free reign to interpret their “mandates” as they see 
fit. 
Constitutional reform is also a priority. If one insists upon maintaining some 
form of presidentialism, a clear separation of powers must exist between all three 
branches of government. Presidential power of appointment should be restricted 
and/or subject to legislative approval. Rule by decree should be forbidden or, at 
minimum, severely circumscribed. Powers to dissolve parliament should be very 
carefully restricted. Parliament should assume the lead in creating a new govern- 
ment. 
I would, however, go a step further and recommend a significant curtailment in 
presidential power. The role of the German president is perhaps instructive. He 
is elected by an electoral college and possesses symbolic power as a source of 
national unity. His political role, however, is highly circumscribed. The prime 
minister, or chancellor, who is elected by parliament, is the major political actor, 
but his position depends upon the support of his party and coalition partners. He 
is sufficiently authoritative to govern effectively, but abuse of power is checked. 
This system entirely avoids the problem of dual executives which has plagued 
Russia, Ukraine, and France. 
Finally, no democracy will be strong without a foundation within society. An 
active citizenry and a pluralist society serve as guards against the emergence and 
persistence of delegative democracy or other still more authoritarian systems. 
However, as Ralf Dahrendorf observes, the “hour of the citizen” will require a 
great deal of time to be realized (Dahrendorf, 1990). Autonomous interest and 
civic associations-the hallmark of civil society-are not built overnight. 
Nonetheless, certain steps can expedite their development. The first is the creation 
of a free market economy, which will break society’s dependence upon the state 
and foster the rise of interest groups and organizations. The second is decentral- 
ization of power, which would give more authority to localities and support local 
initiatives. Organizations would thus be able to have an effect on policies at the 
local level, and this would provide an incentive for increased political participa- 
tion and raise feelings of political competence. Finally, interest associations could 
be brought into the processes of policy-making and implementation, analogous to 
the neo-corporatist arrangements in many countries in Western Europe. This, of 
course, would not be a panacea, but it would help foster notions of shared respon- 
sibility and teach the value and necessity of compromise. 
The transformation of communist societies will require both extraordinary 
patience and political skill. The road from communism to democracy is longer and 
bumpier than the road from democracy to communism. Western models may not 
be able to be transplanted in post-communist soil. Movement to democracy will 
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be slow and halting, but that does not mean that solutions such as delegative 
democracy, which harken backwards to authoritarianism, should or must be 
adopted. Despite its claims to be a means to rescue society, it presents dangers of 
its own and makes the building of democratic institutions even more difficult. If, 
as the record shows, a representative, competitive, pluralist democracy can 
function in states experiencing deep social and economic crises, then trends toward 
delegative democracy, whether as a “necessary evil” or “national savior,” should 
not be welcomed as a positive sign in post-communist political development. 
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